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                   Well-being, economic growth and social recession
In September 2006, The Daily Telegraph  published a letter signed by over one hundred  
professionals and academics. ‘We are’ they wrote, ‘deeply concerned at the escalating 
incidence of childhood depression and children’s behavioural and developmental conditions.’1 
Their letter was prescient of a Unicef report  An overview of child well-being in rich 
countries  published the following  February.2 It paints a bleak picture of British childhood. 
The summary of six dimensions of child well-being places the UK at the bottom of the league. 
There is a growing feeling  that something is  wrong in British society. Rapid and 
uncontrollable change has created a sense of disconnection. Politicians have now begun to 
voice this disquiet.  ‘The Broken Society’ has been a central theme of David Cameron’s 
efforts to modernise the Tory Party.3 Liberal leader Nick Clegg has described Britain as a 
‘Prozac Nation’ suffering a crisis in mental health. The pressure group Compass argues that 
British society is in a state of ‘social recession’.4  
This idea of a social recession has been focussed on the state of childhood.5 In 2004, the 
Nuffield Foundation published its study, ‘Time Trends in Adolescent Mental Health’.6  It 
looked at three generations of fifteen year olds, in 1974, 1986 and 1999 and identified a 
sharp decline in their mental health. Behavioural problems have more than doubled over the 
last 25 years. Emotional problems, such as depression, anxiety and hyperactivity, have 
increased by 70 per cent. What the study cannot  explain is the cause of this trend.  It did 
note however that rising levels of  adolescent mental illness  coincide with improvements in 
economic conditions. Further studies suggest that these levels have reached a plateau. Causal 
explanations have ruled out family size. Nor can it be fully accounted for by the increases in 
single parent families and levels of poverty.7 One study, by Collishaw et al, ends 
inconclusively with the statement that, ‘trends in mental health might also be conceived of as 
a product of both ‘beneficial’ and potentially ‘harmful’ societal changes’. 8
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Children and adolescents are an acutely sensitive measure of the well being of a society. As 
they grow, the fabric of conscious and unconscious communications of  their families, and 
more widely of  culture and class, race and  social relations, are precipitated in them. They 
internalise these social relations which come to form the innermost being of individual 
personality. Problems we associate with individuals - stress, depression, bullying, violence 
- are dysfunctions that originate in their family constellations and wider social networks. 
Research in neuroscience has demonstrated how poor parenting impacts on the bio-
chemistry of children’s bodies, determining their capacity in adulthood to cope with life’s 
stresses. 9 There is now a wealth of evidence that poor attachment or emotional trauma in 
childhood effects long term health.10  Human beings are fundamentally oriented toward and 
dependent upon other people throughout their lives. The psychologist Abraham Maslow 
defines four needs in life: a feeling of safety; a feeling of belonging; a feeling that we are 
worth being loved; and the experience of esteem and respect.11 Individual well-being is not 
an innate, singular and static condition, it is relational and a consequence of social processes 
over time. 
In this paper I want to address the ambiguous conclusion of Collishaw et al’s research. What 
is the relationship between economic growth and individual well-being? What kinds of 
policy solutions might begin to ameliorate our social ills?  To investigate these questions we 
need a methodology that can account for the dynamic inter-connections of social and 
emotional relationships that constitute individuals, and the impact on these of political and 
economic forces.
Social life
 In recent years the importance of social and relational life has increasingly  been recognised 
in government and academic policy making circles. The concept of ‘social capital’ has been 
widely used to counter bias toward economic capital as an explanatory category in policy 
making. The exemplary and oft quoted work in this field is Robert Putnam’s Bowling 
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Alone.12 Putnam seeks to understand the trends in civic disengagement in US society in the 
last third of the 20th century.  His sociology of integration is preoccupied with the search 
for social capital that enhances togetherness, solidarity and consensus - ‘our economy, our 
democracy, and even our health and happiness depend on adequate stocks of social 
capital’(p28). His emphasis is firmly on promoting ‘generalized recipricocity’. In his 
earlier work Putnam is willing to address conflict, difference and antagonism: ‘Racial and 
class inequalities in access to social capital, if properly measured, may  be as great as 
inequalities in financial and human capital, and no less portentous.’ 13 However this 
tentative inquiry into differential relations of  power remains undeveloped in his later 
work. Putnam excludes social movements that challenge the political consensus. The 
dynamics of class and race receive only a cursory overview, and he fails to incorporate into 
his account the relationships of subordination and domination that constitute society. 
As a consequence Putnam, like Collishaw et al,  is left with an enigma: ‘The mysterious 
disengagement of the last third of a century has afflicted all echelons of our society’ (p187). 
Putnam knows that social capital is created in education. Evidence has shown that in the past 
growth in education increases civic engagement. But in the last part of the twentieth century  
increased participation in education did not deliver greater social capital. ‘Whatever forces 
lie behind the slump in civic engagement and social capital, those forces have affected all 
levels of American society’ (p187). Putnam offers lists by way of explanation: busyness, 
time pressure, financial pressure, financial anxiety, urban sprawl, mobility. But these are 
the trees and he can’t see the wood. In the end he can only surmise that the cause is 
generational and intensified by new communication technologies: ‘television and its 
electronic cousins are willing accomplices in the civic mystery’(p246).
Putnam’s methodology of social capital neutralises difference: differences of power, of 
gender, of race and class.  While the concept of social capital answers the need for a 
methodology to understand the central role of social relations in economic development, it 
also serves an ideological function. One reason for its widespread adoption by state actors is 
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its ideological affinity with the status quo. This is most evident in its deployment by the 
World Bank. Francis Fukuyama typifies the way it has been used to promote market based 
development strategies: ‘the economic function of social capital is to reduce transaction costs 
associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic 
rules, and the like.’ 14 
There have been attempts to counter this ideological bias by using Pierre Bourdieu’s theory 
of social capital which recognises the social realities of power and domination. However the 
overall tendency in official policy-making under New Labour has been to ignore the 
systemic, structural determinations of class. The focus has been local, encouraging networks 
and associations in  neighbourhoods to develop thick, bonding and bridging capital. It is an 
approach which transfers risk to those the policies claim to be helping. The causes of 
poverty and deprivation are shifted downward and relocated in the behaviours and values of 
the poor themselves. In the name of ‘self-empowerment’, responsibility for change can be 
invested with them. The realities of power and subordination and the issue of redistributing 
wealth and resources are left unquestioned. 
The problem with the theory of social capital is the way it addresses the role of the social - 
social relationships, association  - in economic development by separating it out from 
political economy. The ‘social’ is treated as if it were a discrete,  internally undifferentiated 
category, unconnected to class relations and to consumption and production.  In other words 
policy is focused on the tree separated out from the wood. A methodology that seeks to 
understand the impact of economic activity on individual well-being has to take into account 
the complex ensemble of relations of political, economic and cultural forces - the wood - 
that constitute the historical conjuncture. A similar problem relates to the term ‘economic 
growth’.
Capitalism and the economy
What is meant by ‘economic growth?  Like the use of the term social capital it tends to be 
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treated as a neutral value. But as Marx argued, there is no singular, ahistorical kind of 
growth, rather there are different epochs characterised by their mode of production. Simon 
Kuznets, in his 1971 Nobel Prize lecture identifies economic epochs defined by technological 
innovation.15 Each epoch generates its own distinctive form of growth which transforms the 
mode of production  and the relations of production. This in turn destroys old forms of social 
life and gives rise to new ones. Kuznets describes economic growth as a ‘controlled 
revolution’. The economist, Joseph Schumpeter is less sanguine about the development of 
capitalism. He describes it as ‘a method of economic change’ which can never be stationary,  
constantly revolutionising itself from within in a process of ‘creative destruction’.16  Marx 
would disagree with both men’s evolutionary economics and the primacy they give to 
technology as an historical force, but they nevertheless echo his description of capitalist 
modernity as  a world in which, ‘all that is solid melts into air’.  Schumpeter describes a  
capitalist order that ‘derives its energy from extra-capitalist patterns of behaviour which 
at the same time it is bound to destroy.’  Much as Rosa Luxemburg says, capital accumulation 
requires the  expropriation of non-capitalist, extra-economic modes of production and 
relations.17
The economic historian Carlota Perez, following Kuznets and Schumpeter, argues that  
successive technological revolutions have created distinct stages of capitalism.18 There are 
problems with this kind of ‘long wave’ theory of economics, but it does offer a useful 
historical perspective. She describes these stages as, the Age of Steam and Railways, the Age 
of Steel, the Age of Electricity and Heavy Engineering, the Age of Oil, the Automobile and 
Mass Production, and the Age of Information and Telecommunications. These stages  are 
surges of economic development that progressively extend capitalism into people’s lives and 
facilitate its expansion across the planet. ‘Each technological revolution brings with it, not 
only a full revamping of the productive structure but eventually also a transformation of the 
institutions of governance, of society and even of ideologies and culture, so deep that one can 
speak about the successive and different modes of growth  in the history of capitalism’ 
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(p25). She also states that modes of economic growth differ within  each stage. 
The historical development of capitalism lies in the periodic revolutionising of its 
instruments and forces of production. Its driving force is capital accumulation which shifts 
between finance led growth and production led growth. Commodification and market relations 
are extended into society. Traditional associations and communities are broken up and 
dispersed. Social relations are reconfigured around exchange value, incorporating into the 
social bonds of individuals a greater element of the rational choice of the market. In the last 
three decades Britain has been experiencing such a transition, as Perez’s Age of Information 
supersedes the Fordist era of mass production. Old ways of life disappear, or they lose their 
former preeminence and coexist with the new, not just in social formations and economic 
structures, but within the cultural identities and the social being of individuals. We can 
identify political, economic and cultural elements of these changes, but we do not yet have a 
way of describing the kind of society we are living in. The explanatory frameworks of 
political economy and sociology inherited from the the nineteenth century leave too much 
unsaid. Each new stage involves a struggle to find a theoretical language to make sense of the 
changes being lived through. 
Britain’s old model of industrial production began to fail in the 1970s. The post war 
political settlement of full employment and a welfare state came to an end. 19 New 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) revolutionised the generation, 
processing and transmission of information, turning it into a fundamental source of 
productivity. Radical innovations, backed by financial capital penetrated the old order and 
began to modernize the whole productive structure. In the South East, high technology 
manufacturing and services created new types of ‘post-fordist’ firms, products and markets. 
Central to their development was the domestic and global liberalisation of  the capital 
markets and direct foreign investment.  The values and counter-cultures of the 1960s young 
middle classes provided the resources for capitalism to remake itself into an economy of 
individualised consumer choice. These created a powerful cultural trend toward a ‘liberation 
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ethic’ of individual self-expression and creativity, anti-establishment sentiment, emotional 
attunement to the world, and the personal pursuit of pleasure. 
This economic and cultural activity was articulated by the ascendent ideology of neo-
liberalism. The Conservative government of 1979 applied Milton Friedman’s ‘shock 
therapy’ to the British economy. Mass unemployment and  de-industrialisation created a 
social catastrophe in the North and in South Wales. The South East developed rapidly. The 
economy was opened up to global flows of trade and finance which led to the increasing 
dominance of the City and the financial industries. The business model of the financial sector 
became the paradigm of the capitalist revival. Traditional profit seeking  was no longer the 
sole driver of economic activity. What counted was increasing shareholder value. Company 
directors were part paid in share options to align their self interest with  company 
profitability. Business productivity failed to grow, but their pay soared.  Companies began to 
constantly ‘re-engineer’ - creating new products and markets, restructuring and re-
branding - to signal their economic dynamism to the capital markets. The demand for 
constant change created organisational cultures in a state of permanent  insecurity. 
In 1997 New Labour achieved power by accommodating itself to the neo-liberal orthodoxy 
and developing its own US style aspirational individualism. Its commitment to extend market 
based reform and deepen the liberal restructuring of the economy and society is exemplified 
in two documents. The 1998 Competitiveness White Paper, Our Competitive Future - 
Building the Knowledge Driven Economy, set out a framework for Britain’s industrial policy 
in which the market was central. Peter Mandelson, then Minister of Trade and Industry, 
delivered New Labour's vision: 'Knowledge and its profitable exploitation by business is the 
key to competitiveness'.20 The 2001 White Paper on Enterprise, Skills and Innovation,  
addressed the creation of a labour force for the knowledge economy. Education and training 
would create workers who were autonomous entrepreneurs rather than dependent 
employees. New Labour would use the business model of the financial sector to drive forward 
its market based reforms in education, and in welfare and health.
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A capitalism of culture and intimacy
Economic growth in the last few decades has been in new forms of production and 
consumption that have been reshaping society and social relationships. The fastest growing 
economic sector during the 1990s was the cultural industries - advertising, architecture, 
TV and radio, music, publishing, film and video, design, designer fashion, and computer and 
video games. Their raw materials are the intangible assets of information, sounds, words, 
symbols, images, ideas, produced in creative, emotional and intellectual labour. Technology 
is facilitating new cultural practices and at the same time opening up opportunities for 
capital to commodify them. New kinds of property and property relations are being created 
by companies using patenting and intellectual property law. Just as early industrial 
capitalism enclosed the commons of land and labour, so the ICT driven post-industrial 
capitalism of today is enclosing the cultural and intellectual commons (both real and 
virtual), the commons of the human mind and body, and the commons of biological life.
 This knowledge and cultural capitalism is extending commodification into the realms of 
individual social being. Its forms of production are not confined to output, but use 
individuals and their relationships in the co-inventing of cultural and symbolic meanings 
and new ideas. The economic sphere expands as production conscripts the thinking, 
imagination and sensibilities of individuals. The divide between social relations and the 
exchange value of the market is blurred. Work and life are increasingly integrated in the 
new industries. The Italian social theorist, Paulo Virno argues that the productive force of 
this post-fordist economic activity is ‘the life of the mind’.21 Not just thinking, but also 
intuition and the symbolic world of the unconscious.
Education plays a central role in producing the new modes of consumption and production. 
Schools, colleges and universities have been subjected to continuous organisational change in 
an attempt to gear them to the labour market and knowledge economy. Universities, schools, 
healthcare and welfare have been turned into quasi- or proxy markets. Targets are used to 
replicate the  incentives of price and competition, performance management stands in for the 
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incentive of profit.  The ethic of professionalism and trust is degraded and replaced by 
‘accountability’  to the market based criteria of efficiency, ‘value for money’ and 
productivity.  
 The function of education in this new regime is to develop the productivity of the ‘life of the 
mind’, and facilitate the restructuring of the class relations of production. In school and at 
work, a culture of capitalism rewards individuals who comply with market-shaped criteria 
to measure, judge and discipline themselves in pursuit of a self-reliant, entrepreneurial 
form of life. The productivity of labour in health, care, welfare and education which has no 
tangible end product is measured by performance in comparison to peers. This new culture 
of capitalism is about producing the social being of the individual as a form of economic 
potential. 
Class
Central to the ideology of the new capitalism is the idea that a class-based society is giving 
way to a more individualised, meritocratic culture. Sociologist Anthony Giddens who has been 
a significant intellectual influence on New Labour argues that detraditionalization and  self-
reflexive individualisation have replaced the valency of class as a social and political 
category. 22 Ulrich Beck has described a capitalism without class.23  While there is greater 
individualisation its development is uneven, not only across consumption and work, but also 
within the psyches and cultural identities of individuals. Class remains a constitutive part of 
the capitalist order.  We live in a time not of capitalism without class, but of capitalism 
destroying and recreating class cultures and class relations around its new modes of 
production and the productive force of the ‘life of the mind’.  
The traditional working class in the UK, formed out of  previous stages of industrial 
development, has lost its economic function as the manufacturer of wealth creation. 
Manufacturing as a share of GDP fell to 13.2 per cent in 2006. With the introduction of new 
technologies, its workforce continues to decline. Goods are increasingly imported from a 
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periphery of poor, low-wage economies where primitive forms of capital accumulation, 
backed up by WTO rules and bilateral trade agreements, are creating a global proletariat in 
conditions of violence and exploitation. In the new capitalism class has transcended the 
boundaries of the nation and is developing a global structure. 
In Britain, one in six leaves school unable to read, write or add up properly. One in four 
16-17 year olds are not in education, employment or training. Social mobility has 
diminished. Health inequalities are entrenched. Success in education, and life chances in 
general, remain dependent on family background.24 The fastest growing occupations are not 
in creative and knowledge work, but in low paid jobs such as data input, admin, face-to-face 
services in health, education and care.25 Half the population share just 6 per cent of UK 
wealth, earning the median annual income of around £18876 or less.26 In contrast  the top 
1 per cent of individuals - 470,000 people -  earn an average annual income of £220,000 
and between them own approximately 25 per cent of marketable wealth. Within this group 
wealth is unevenly distributed, with the top 0.1 per cent earning an average of 
£780,000.27
De-industrialisation has left large sections of the population unemployable or living and 
working as if they are a reserve army of labour. Millions are economically inactive, or 
working in casualised and temporary jobs, or threatened with the loss of their job. Migrant 
labour is used by unscrupulous employers to push down wages and working conditions. The 
institution of work, once a source of collective cultural identity, has become fragmented, 
making forms of class solidarity difficult to organise.  Class consciousness is displaced by 
the fear of redundancy, not simply from employment but from life’s purpose. 
 In the society of consumers, class develops a new lexicon of cultural domination. Individual 
status-seeking consumption recreates the old class conflicts. Consumption offers the pursuit 
of pleasure and desire, but it is also a mass symbolic struggle for individual social 
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recognition, which distributes humiliation to those lower down the hierarchy. The shame of 
failing in education, of being a loser in the race to success, of being invisible to those above, 
cuts a deep wound in the psyche. Shame is the deficiency of self- love and the destruction of 
self-esteem.  As James Gilligan describes it, it ‘is synonymous with feelings of inferiority; 
and inferiority is a relative concept based on an invidious comparison between one’s self or 
group and other individuals and groups.’28  Research by Richard Wilkinson has  shown how 
this kind of humiliation dramatically increases vulnerability to disease and premature 
death. Drawing on the findings of neuroscience he argues that, ‘the variety of physiological 
processes affected by chronic anxiety  mean that its health effects are in many respects 
analogous to more rapid ageing’.29  As he points out, violence is more common where there 
is more inequality because people are deprived of the markers of status and so are more 
vulnerable to the anxieties of being judged by others.  Inequality not only damages the life 
chances of people living in poverty, it adversely effects the quality of life of everyone. 
This is the culture of consumption that has driven growth in the UK economy. It has been 
primed by the hard selling of cheap credit, which has made accessible a never ending value 
chain of positional goods. Total UK personal debt stands at £1.4 trillion. £223bn is 
unsecured debt.30 These levels of debt have created an indentured form of consumption as the 
capital markets lay claim to great tranches of  future earnings.  Cheap credit has fuelled the 
highly lucrative market in debt securitisation that generated the City bonuses of the super-
rich. In 2007, despite the increasing likelihood of market failure, these totaled £14bn.
Social recession
In the last three decades GDP has almost doubled. But growing wealth has created significant 
inequalities and social division. Nor does it appear to have brought with it an increased 
satisfaction with life. This perception has encouraged the rising profile of well-being and 
happiness studies. Richard Easterlin was one of the first economists to study statistics on the 
reported levels of happiness in society.  He  concluded that in the USA: ‘higher income was 
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not systematically accompanied by greater happiness.’ 31 Andrew Oswald investigated this 
claim and  looked at the evidence  indicating satisfaction with life in Europe since 1973. The 
results, he suggests, broadly bear out Easterlin’s conclusions. They  counter the idea that 
‘better economic performance means more happiness for a nation.’ 32  ‘Reported levels of 
“satisfaction with life” in Europe are only slightly higher than they were twenty years 
ago.’33 The trend is  confirmed by the measures of subjective well being (SWB) which 
assess the psychological state of the population, for example personal development and self 
fulfillment. These have shown little movement over the last thirty years.34 
Capitalist development has generated affluence for a majority, but there is a large body of 
evidence that economic restructuring and market growth has created a social recession. 
Government policies that have facilitated the expansion of the market economy into the 
public sector have also contributed to the problem. Reforms of schooling have promoted a 
meritocratic, competitive  individualism in an education system profoundly divided by class 
inequality. An instrumental  culture of testing and goal-focused learning has imposed a 
narrow and functional approach to education.  In 2004, the New Economic Foundation, in 
partnership with Nottingham City Council,   organised a  study of 1000 pupils which looked 
at their  enjoyment and pleasure in life,  and at their personal development -  interest, 
curiosity, commitment.  65 per cent of primary age children rated their school experience 
as positive.  But for  secondary age children this dropped to  27 per cent.  The trend was 
repeated for other responses. ‘I learn a lot at school’, falls from 71 per cent to 18 per cent 
between  primary and secondary. ‘I enjoy school activities’, drops from 65 per cent to 18 
per cent.’35 
A similar problem of morale can be found in the world of work. A  survey  by the 
qualifications authority City and Guilds  reported that only  17 per cent of health 
professionals, 8 per cent of teachers and 2 per cent of social workers said they were happy 
with their jobs.36 Britain has a high proportion of its workforce engaged in mundane, low 
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paid and tedious jobs, with few opportunities to train and improve skills.  A 2005 report by 
Mind described stress in the workplace at almost ‘epidemic proportions’.37    While trade 
union militancy has declined, work-related ill-health has increased, particularly in the 
public sector.  A report from the national director for health and work estimates its cost to 
the economy at £100bn. 38 Stress, anxiety and depression account for a third of all  working 
days lost. 
The 2000 Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity reported that one in six adults was suffering 
from anxiety or a depressive condition. Of these, only 24 per cent were receiving treatment 
and as few as 9 per cent had access to psychological therapies.39 The numbers are broadly 
similar to the previous 1993 survey, except there has been a marked increase in sleep 
problems; up from 21 per cent to 24 per cent for men, and up from 28 per cent to 34 per 
cent for women.  A survey on sleep undertaken by  the Future Foundation revealed that the 
biggest cause of sleep disorders is anxiety.  Women  coping with paid work,  housework and 
childcare  suffer more than men. The survey’s manager, Brian Garvey, in an attempt to 
explain the findings,  said: ‘ Fear has become a powerful tool in society. A nervousness 
permeates our current lives.’ 40  His assertion is difficult to prove, but it is reflected in the 
general decline in levels  of trust. The decline is felt most strongly amongst working class 
people. A MORI survey found that the least trusting group lived on council estates in 
ethnically diverse areas where crime and vandalism are seen as serious problems.41 
Poverty and  poor diet contribute to long term chronic health problems. There is a serious 
increase in  obesity amongst children.  The 2004 National Health Survey found that amongst 
11-15 year olds 26.7 per cent of girls and 24.2 per cent of boys qualified as obese.42 A 
generation is at risk of type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and premature death.  The 
targeting of children by corporate advertising is a major cause of the increase in the 
consumption of junk food.43 Similarly the aggressive marketing of alcohol has seen 
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significant increases in alcohol consumption over the last two decades. The Mental Health 
Foundation estimate that over 1.1 million people in Britain are dependent upon alcohol. 44 
Alcohol related illness and death continue to rise forming part of an alcohol culture of broken 
relationships, domestic violence against women and street brawling.  As Wilkinson et al 
point out, the scale of stress and anxiety which arises from people’s constant daily 
insecurities and experience of social position ‘leads to increased reliance on the use of 
tobacco, alcohol and drugs which provide at least temporary escape from stress.’ 45
The freedom of choice many enjoy can veer toward a tyranny of objectless desire, an opaque 
and unbounded world that leads to all kinds of compulsive and addictive behaviours. Personal 
boundaries are more easily pierced by nameless fears. Young women suffering low levels of 
esteem are incited into states of self-dislike and anxious body-management.46 The collapse 
of traditional communities, and the acceleration of individualised, entrepreneurial forms of 
life,  erode the ‘containing’ psycho-sociological structures in which children grow into 
adulthood.  The liberalising of attitudes to sexuality, democratisation of relationships 
between men and women, and the albeit slow, uneven changing role of fathers  represents the 
continued decline of a patriarchal culture and society. This is a long term good, but in the 
short term the loss of its  ‘containing’ structures has weakened the symbolic boundaries and 
forms of adult authority that once reproduced normative identities and social behaviour. 
Capitalism has both accelerated this process and also impeded the development of alternative, 
more egalitarian and democratic forms of authority. 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for younger people to create an independent life of their 
own. The traditional  symbolic and institutional rites of passage into adulthood - leaving 
home, entering employment, establishing a family, and taking on legal obligations and rights 
- have either disappeared or become extended in ways that create an ambiguous relationship 
to adulthood for young people. 47 As a society we are no longer clear about what defines 
adulthood. This uncertainty is characteristic of all stages of life, from social and emotional 
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expectations toward children, to the value and role of older people. Even the experience of 
death and dying has lost social meaning. Despite the great majority wanting to die at home, 
statistically speaking, we are likely to succumb to a chronic illness and end our life in a 
hospital, in an impersonal, possibly painful, techno-medical death. 
A society of anxiety has created what Trine Fotel and Thyra Uth Thomsen describe as 
‘insularized mobility between islands of activities.’48  Swathes of public space are 
transmogrified into potentially dangerous places that are avoided or only passed through in 
the insularity of our cars.  As Tim Gill reports, ‘between 1971 and 1990  the ‘home 
habitat’ of a typical 8-year-old - the area  that a child can travel around on their own - has 
shrunk to one-ninth of its former size.’49  Parents restrict their children’s mobility 
because of justified anxieties about traffic. But there also exists a fear of abduction, 
molestation  and arbitrary acts of violence.   As a consequence,  children have become 
isolated from their neighbourhoods. The playground two streets away is now a hostile and 
forbidding place.  
It has become commonplace to feel one lives, so to speak, as a stranger outside the 
community. Cultural difference is the prism through which large sections of the white 
population experience and react to their insecurity. Migrants are viewed as competition for 
housing and under-resourced public services. They become the portents of social disaster 
and cultural loss. In  a recent survey 52 per cent of white working class people thought 
immigration a bad thing, compared to 33 per cent of white middle class people.50  Political 
antagonisms and culture wars around race, gender and religion attempt to construct 
boundaries of identity which will define a sense of belonging and entitlement. At stake in the 
transition from an investment in an imagined mono-culture to a capacity to live with multi-
culture is the struggle for individual and cultural recognition. As Sue Gerhardt argues, ‘we 
are dependent on what others see, and how much of our “being” they recognise’.51 Mutual 
recognition is essential for creating the shared, symbolic idea of ‘society’ in the minds of its 
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individuals. Class inequality creates a paucity of recognition, and cultural difference 
becomes a focus for people’s fear, paranoia and hatred.  As a result individuals feel insecure 
and disconnected and come to see the social world as divided and fragmented.
The uncertainty, the constant change and the decline in a sense of belonging herald the 
cultural destruction of the traditional working class. Life continues but the cultural symbols 
and institutions that once gave it meaning are disappearing. Those who flourished in the old 
class culture find themselves ill equipped to deal with the new uncertainties. For them the 
future becomes difficult to imagine. The question of hope is bound to the question of how to 
live. To lose a way of life is to lose a sense of hopefulness.
 We are living in what Abraham Maslow calls a low synergy society.52 Our institutions are 
failing to create a synergy between individual ambition and the common good. Instead  we 
have a society in which ‘the advantage of one individual becomes a victory over another.’ 
Wealth attracts wealth. The majority who are not victorious must cope as best they can. In 
Britain, the political response to the crisis of capitalism and the radical restructuring of the 
economy has led to the widespread deprivation of Maslow’s individual needs of safety, 
belonging, love and respect.
What next?
The  outcomes of the new capitalist forms of growth are contradictory. Material prosperity 
has raised the living standards of a majority, but it has produced a social recession. Change 
has brought both beneficial and harmful effects. Britain faces acute problems in recovering 
a more equal, sustainable and fairer society. Large  areas of the country have lost their 
economic base. Employment is sustained by high levels of public spending and is vulnerable 
to a change of government or an economic downturn. The political and ruling classes, heavily 
influenced by economic liberalism,  drove the process of restructuring the economy and 
society further and deeper than other European countries. Institutions in education, health 
and welfare, required for social recovery have been depleted by marketisation. Many are  
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emotionally impoverished,  their staff isolated and demoralised and their organisational 
cultures fearful and risk averse. Public service  values such as the common good, care, 
trust, communication and human relationships have been made peripheral to market defined, 
measurable outcomes. This low synergy between individuals and public institutions is 
reproduced in the political sphere with the popular disaffection from the formal institutions 
and political parties of representative democracy.  Economic reliance on the City and its 
financial industries makes it much more difficult to neutralise their political influence and 
damaging social consequences. As a predominantly service economy we cannot shift our 
priorities back to production capital in order to create stable and more equitable forms of 
economic development. 
Carlota Perez argues that the transition period of the new modes of production and 
consumption requires two or three turbulent decades. After this time the contradictions in 
the system cause a recession or depression which marks a turning point, followed by a 
period in which production is consolidated. She characterises this turning point as a time of 
social reform and rethinking.  The bursting of the dot com bubble in 2000 marked its 
inception. It was, however, stemmed by the US Federal Reserve Bank which created a second 
bubble in the housing market. The sub-prime mortgage crisis has now burst this bubble. 
What will come next? There are a number of possible outcomes. First, a serious recession 
could strengthen the political forces of the right. Second and dependent upon there being only 
an economic  downturn, the current Labour government could maintain itself in power. 
Third, economic recession could force it to adopt a more interventionist approach to the 
economy. It is this third, and least likely, outcome that holds the best prospect for 
alleviating the social recession and  developing  an alternative version of prosperity centred 
around well-being. 
The idea of individual well-being has an increasing resonance amongst significant minorities 
of the population. For the middle classes who have gained the most from the last few decades, 
the benefits of economic growth are now offset by anxieties over debt, the growing pressures 
and costs of education, the prospect of falling house prices, and the threat of economic 
17
recession. The fear of impoverishment in old age, and the burdens of caring for aged 
relatives, extend across the population. Compounding these is the epochal threat of global 
warming. For the great majority of people, there are no individual, market solutions to 
these problems. 
To conclude, what kind of policy strategies might alleviate the social recession and enhance 
well-being? They should focus on four issues: security, social justice, democracy and 
ecology. There has to be a new kind of relationship between social justice and security whose 
principle goal is ending poverty and reducing inequality.  Electoral reform, enlarging 
individual freedom,  promoting trade unionism and devolving power back to local government 
would re-energise individual and collective political agency.  Climate change is the major 
challenge of the era.  Tackling climate change and the end of oil will require a New Green Deal 
that will need new hypothicated green taxes, mutuals and pension funds to create a green 
economy in transport, consumerism and  new industries in recycling, insulation and 
renewable technologies. The paradox of climate change is that the size of its threat is the size 
of the political  opportunity to create a collective sense of purpose toward a common good.  
Jonathan Rutherford March 2008
Jonathan@jrutherford.demon.co.uk
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